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Reconstructing RFRA: The Contested Legacy of
Religious Freedom Restoration
Martin S. Lederman
in t r o d u c t io n
Almost every member of Congress voted to approve the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA),1 a bill endorsed by an unprecedented
coalition of dozens of religious and civil rights organizations spanning the
political and ideological spectrum.2 President Clinton quipped at the signing
ceremony that perhaps only divine intervention could explain such an unusual
meeting of the minds: the establishment of “new trust” across otherwise
irreconcilable “ideological and religious lines,” he remarked, “shows . . . that
the power of God is such that, even in the legislative process, miracles can
happen.”3
The RFRA consensus was especially “miraculous” because the legislation
addressed a deeply divisive question: whether and under what circumstances
religious objectors should be exempt from generally applicable laws. RFRA’s
supporters, both within and outside Congress, would surely have had sharp
disagreements about many specific claims for religious exemptions to

1.

Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seq.).

2.

The House approved RFRA by voice vote without opposition, and only three Senators
opposed the legislation. See 139 Cong. Rec. 26416 (1993) (Senate); 139 Cong. Rec. 27239-41
(1993) (House). The “Coalition for the Free Exercise of Religion” that lobbied in support of
RFRA included 66 organizations, ranging from the Christian Legal Society, the Episcopal
Church, and the National Association of Evangelicals to the American Civil Liberties
Union, the American Humanist Association and Americans United for Separation of Church
and State. See BAPTIST JOINT COMMITTEE FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
RESTORATION ACT: 20 YEARS OF PROTECTING OUR FIRST FREEDOM 6, http://bjconline
.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/RFRA-Book-FINAL.pdf [http://perma.cc/J9QY-K98F]
(reproducing a Letter from Oliver S. Thomas, Coalition Chair, to a Senator, October 20,
1993) (listing organizations).

3.

Remarks on Signing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 1 PUB. PAPERS 2000
(Nov. 16, 1993).
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particular laws. Yet they coalesced around RFRA, which circumvented such
disagreements at the retail level by codifying a “cross-cutting” statutory
standard that judges would be required to apply to an undifferentiated and
unknown array of future claims for exemptions to every generally applicable
law in the land.
RFRA’s operative language provides that if application of a law or
regulation to a person “substantially burdens” her exercise of religion, the
government must exempt that person from operation of the law, unless the
government can demonstrate that denying such an exemption is the “least
restrictive means” of furthering a “compelling governmental interest.”4
Congress concluded that this “test,” “set forth in prior Federal court
rulings”5—including the Supreme Court’s Free Exercise Clause decisions in
Sherbert v. Verner6 and Wisconsin v. Yoder,7 both of which RFRA invokes by
name8—”is a workable test for striking sensible balances between religious
liberty and competing prior governmental interests.”9
In 1997, the Supreme Court held that Congress did not have constitutional
authority to impose RFRA as a limit on state and local laws.10 RFRA continues
to apply to all federal law, however. And in 2000 the same wide-ranging
coalition of religious and civil rights groups reunited with President Clinton to
help secure enactment of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act (RLUIPA),11 which applies the RFRA “test” to two discrete areas of state
law: land use regulation, and the treatment of prisoners and other persons
confined in state-operated institutions. More than twenty states have also
enacted their own “mini-RFRAs” that require religious exemptions to state and
local laws under certain circumstances—sometimes using language similar or
identical to that found in the federal RFRA.12 In yet other states, similar

4.

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)-(b).

5.

Id. § 2000bb-1(a)(5).

6.

374 U.S. 398 (1963).

7.

406 U.S. 205 (1972).

8.

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1).

9.

Id. § 2000bb(a)(5).

10.

City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).

11.

Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 804 (2000) (principally codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc et
seq.).

12.

See generally Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs, 55
S.D. L. REV. 466, 476-79 & 477 n.67 (2010); State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, NAT’L
CONF. STATE LEGIS. (Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal
-justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx [http://perma.cc/NG2L-XM9E].
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religious exemption tests apply by virtue of judicial construction of state
constitutions.13
The broad, bipartisan consensus in favor of such “general,” cross-cutting
religious accommodation statutes has persisted throughout the past
generation.14 Yet the RFRA coalition is now fraying at the seams and is in
danger of permanent disintegration. The immediate source of the schism is
clear—namely, the recent RFRA challenges to the so-called “contraception
mandate.” In those cases, dozens of employers and universities have claimed
that RFRA entitles them to exemptions from the regulatory requirement,
under the “preventive health services” provision of the Affordable Care Act,15
that employee and student health insurance plans reimburse plan beneficiaries
for the costs of most methods of contraception.16
In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,17 the Supreme Court held that several
closely held for-profit corporations were entitled to a RFRA exemption from
that regulation because the executive agencies had at least one “less restrictive”
way to further the government’s compelling interest in ensuring that the
companies’ female employees (and employee dependents) would have
affordable access to effective contraception. The agencies had not
demonstrated, the Court reasoned, why they could not make available to those
for-profit employers the same “accommodation” that the agencies had offered
to religious nonprofit organizations. Pursuant to that accommodation, the
insurance company that administers the plan reimburses beneficiaries for the
costs of contraception, without any payment, administration, or other
involvement by the objecting employer.18

13.

See Kara Loewentheil, The Satanic Temple, Scott Walker, and Contraception: A Partial Account
of Hobby Lobby’s Implications for State Law, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 89, 104-05 n.75 (2015).

14.

To cite only the latest example, a wide array of amici, including many of the members of the
“Coalition for the Free Exercise of Religion” and the federal government, filed in support of
a Muslim prisoner’s RLUIPA challenge to a state prison regulation in Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S.
Ct. 853 (2015). See Holt v. Hobbs, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case
-files/cases/holt-v-hobbs [http://perma.cc/YLB2-FJ8X] (listing amici and linking to briefs).

15.

42 U.S.C. § 300gg–13.

16.

See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv) (incorporating “guidelines supported by the Health
Resources and Services Administration,” which in turn include all FDA-approved
contraceptive methods, as prescribed by a health care provider, other than condoms and
vasectomies, see 77 Fed. Reg. 8725 (Feb. 15, 2012)); see also Marty Lederman, Compendium of
posts on Hobby Lobby, Zubik, and related cases, BALKINIZATION (Nov. 8, 2015), http://
balkin.blogspot.com/2014/02/compendium-of-posts-on-hobby-lobby-and.html
[http://
perma.cc/5DQQ-LR6K] (linking to dozens of posts about various aspects of the RFRA cases
seeking exemptions from the contraception regulation).

17.

134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).

18.

See id. at 2759-60, 2782; see also 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(c)-(f) (providing the accommodation for
religious nonprofit organizations).
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In its current Term, the Supreme Court is considering consolidated cases
brought by thirty-seven nonprofit organizations.19 Those plaintiffs allege that
RFRA entitles them to an exemption from even the regulatory accommodation,
so that neither the organizations themselves, nor the insurance companies
that administer the employee and student health insurance plans, would
provide contraception coverage to female beneficiaries. If the Court accepts
these organizations’ RFRA arguments, many thousands of their employees,
dependents, and students—unlike nearly all other women in the United
States—would not be reimbursed for the costs of contraception, which would,
in turn, result in many more unintended pregnancies.20
The current tensions within the old free-exercise coalition are not,
however, solely a function of the RFRA claims involving the contraception
regulation. As Douglas NeJaime and Reva Siegel elaborate in Conscience Wars,21
there is widespread fear in some quarters—and presumably hope in others—
that such claims might become a template for similar claims, pursuant to
federal or state RFRAs or analogous state constitutional provisions, for
religious exemptions from laws that prohibit discrimination in employment, or
in the provision of public accommodations, on the basis of sexual orientation.
Such fears might not be warranted. Because there are not yet many such
antidiscrimination laws in force, post-Hobby Lobby RFRA claims asserting a
religious right to discriminate have been rare, and none has yet succeeded.22
Nor is it likely that courts will adjudicate many such claims in the near future:
once such antidiscrimination laws do attract enough public support to be
enacted, very few businesses will be willing to publicly seek the legal right not
to serve same-sex couples—a sure ticket to financial ruin. And in the unusual
cases that do proceed to litigation, odds are that few (if any) courts will permit

19.

The lead case is Zubik v. Burwell, No. 14-1418. See Marty Lederman, Unpacking the
Forthcoming RFRA Challenges to the Government’s Accommodation (with Emphasis on SelfInsured Plans), BALKINIZATION (July 18, 2014), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/07
/unpacking-forthcoming-rfra-challenges.html [http://perma.cc/5GZG-ZNJT] (identifying
the disparate ways in which the regulation would affect the thirty-seven distinct
petitioners).

20.

See Brief of the Guttmacher Institute and Professor Sara Rosenbaum as Amici Curiae in
Support of the Government, Zubik v. Burwell, Nos. 14-1418 et al. (Feb. 17, 2016).

21.

Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in
Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2561-63 (2015).

22.

One such case is currently pending before the Washington Supreme Court: A florist who
refuses to provide flowers for a same-sex wedding has invoked, inter alia, the religious
freedom provision of the Washington Constitution’s Declaration of Rights as a defense
to application of state antidiscrimination laws. See Brief of Appellants at 32-36, State v.
Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., No. 91615-2 (Wash. Oct. 16, 2015), http://www.adfmedia.org/files
/ArlenesOpeningBrief.pdf [http://perma.cc/J3W4-LR93].
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retail establishments to exclude same-sex couples, or allow employers to
discriminate against them.23
Nevertheless, the prospect of such claims for exemptions from
antidiscrimination laws is undeniably the genesis of recent efforts by some
state legislators to enact or strengthen their local RFRAs. Yet those efforts, too,
have been unavailing, largely because politicians of both parties realize how
devastating such enactments would be to the economic well-being of
enterprises in their states.24 Moreover, given the current, inexorable increase in
public support for same-sex equality norms, it is almost certain that when
legislatures enact new antidiscrimination statutes, they will not include robust,
statute-specific religious exemptions within those laws,25 nor enact separate
laws designed to provide robust religious exemptions to the antidiscrimination
rules.26
If this legislative trend continues, then the existing federal and state RFRAs
will become virtually the whole game—the only possible sources for religious
exceptions to such new antidiscrimination norms.
Even so, the prospect of such future RFRA litigation hardly explains why
many people and organizations who once supported—and who generally
continue to support—RFRA, RLUIPA, and similar accommodation laws are
becoming increasingly wary of such cross-cutting religious liberty protections.
After all, as I explain below, for more than seventy years courts have virtually

23.

See generally Ira C. Lupu, Moving Targets: Obergefell, Hobby Lobby, and the Future of LGBT
Rights, 7 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 1, 15-24, 67-73 (2015). If any such suits were to meet with
success, they would most likely be those brought by nonprofit employers seeking to deny
employment benefits to employees’ same-sex spouses. I am not aware of any such claims
yet, however.

24.

See Andrew Koppelman, Gay Rights, Religious Accommodations, and the Purposes of
Antidiscrimination Law, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 619, 631-38 (2015) (describing recent efforts in
Arizona, Mississippi, Georgia, Indiana, Oklahoma and Arkansas); see also Marty Lederman,
Hobby Lobby Part XI—Governor Brewer’s Veto in Arizona . . . and Hobby Lobby (Mar.
12, 2014), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/03/hobby-lobby-part-xi-governor-brewers.html
[http://perma.cc/6BWM-2XWW]; Alan Blinder and Campbell Robertson, Conservative
Lawmakers Push New Legal Protections for Opponents of Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
3, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/04/us/gay-rights-religious-freedom-legislation
-states.html [http://perma.cc/HKG2-Y9FG] (quoting Douglas Laycock as saying that such
new proposed state RFRAs “have become politically toxic”).

25.

For example, when the federal Non-Discrimination in Employment Act is reintroduced in a
future Congress, it almost surely will not include the broad religious exemption found in
earlier versions of the legislation. See Ed O’Keefe, Gay Rights Groups Withdraw Support of
ENDA after Hobby Lobby Decision, WASH. POST (July 8, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/post-politics/wp/2014/07/08/gay-rights-group-withdrawing-support-of-enda
-after-hobby-lobby-decision/ [http://perma.cc/CNR4-BMQV].

26.

See, e.g., Blinder and Robertson, supra note 24 (reporting that Republican officials and
business interests are strongly resisting a new round of proposed legal protections for
opponents of gay rights).
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always rejected claims for religious exemptions in commercial settings, even
when they have purported to apply a “compelling interest”/”least restrictive
means” test of the sort found in RFRA.27 If that decades-old trend were to
continue, there would be no cause for alarm.
All of a sudden, however, there is a very real chance, in the forthcoming
cases involving nonprofits’ RFRA challenges to the contraception regulation
accommodation, that the Supreme Court might depart sharply from that
historical norm, and transform RFRA into a much more robust engine of
religious exemptions to commercial regulations. What brought us to this
point? Who, if anyone, has betrayed the common ground on which the RFRA
consensus was so carefully constructed—and how have they done so? Those
important questions lurk just beneath the surface of Douglas NeJaime and
Reva Siegel’s timely and provocative Conscience Wars.
i. w h a t ’s s o n e w a b o u t t h e n e w c o m p lic it y c la im s ?
NeJaime and Siegel richly detail two important aspects of the recent
accommodation claims—characteristics they describe as novel, potentially
destabilizing, and, perhaps, reasons to be wary of the requested exemptions.
First, they emphasize a formal feature of the recent claims: the way in
which the plaintiffs characterize how the challenged laws “substantially
burden” their exercise of religion. Virtually all of the plaintiffs in the
contraception and discrimination cases assert that the state would require them
to facilitate immoral conduct—to be complicit in others’ wrongdoing—in a way
their religion allegedly prohibits. These sorts of claims, by their very nature,
label other private parties “as sinners in ways that can stigmatize and
demean.”28 The employer plaintiffs in Hobby Lobby and Zubik, for instance,
assert that the ACA regulation would compel their forbidden complicity in
employees’ sinful use of contraception (or sinful engagement in nonprocreative
sex).29 Similarly, the bakery or bed-and-breakfast owner who wishes to turn
away same-sex couples claims an exemption on the ground that she is
religiously forbidden from abetting the sin of same-sex marriage or sexual
activity.
NeJaime and Siegel are right that this is a distinctive feature of the recent
controversial RFRA claims. Yet, contrary to their suggestion, such claims are
not novel, nor are they discordant with Congress’s design in enacting RFRA.
Several of the Supreme Court’s Free Exercise decisions between 1963 and 1990,
27.

See infra notes 105-108 and accompanying text.

28.

NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 21, at 2576.

29.

See, e.g., Brief for Respondents at 9-10, 34-36, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.
Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-354); Brief for Petitioners in Nos. 15-35, et al. at 51-53, East Texas
Baptist Univ. v. Burwell, No. 15-35 (Jan. 4, 2016) [hereinafter ETBU Pet. Br.].
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which RFRA effectively incorporated,30 involved complicity claims, or were
otherwise predicated upon an asserted religious injunction to be dissociated
from the sins of others.31
Regardless of whether such claims are especially new, NeJaime and Siegel
appear to be concerned that courts adjudicating RFRA claims might not
recognize, or sufficiently account for, the distinct dignitary harms that are
inflicted when claimants in effect accuse others of acting immorally. They are
appropriately careful, however, to clarify that what troubles them is not the
mere fact of the religious objector’s disapprobation32—something that would
be apparent even if the court denied the religious exemption33—but, rather, the
prospect that the state itself would, by conferring the exemption, “express[]
the message that contraception [or other third-party conduct] is sinful.”34
Whether the state expresses such a message will depend, of course, “on the
way the government structures the accommodation.”35 It is difficult to imagine
a RFRA case, however, in which this concern would determine the outcome.
Most importantly, in some cases a state agency might be able to craft a
substitution “work-around” in order to both grant the requested religious
accommodation and prevent any harm to third parties. The federal agencies’
accommodation to the contraception regulation, in which a non-objecting

30.

See infra Part III.

31.

In Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968), for example, a corporation’s
principal owner argued that federal law requiring his barbeque restaurants to serve black
customers violated his free exercise rights by requiring him to be complicit in sin: based
upon his reading of the Old Testament, he “believe[d] as a matter of religious faith” that
such service would be a “contribution” to “racial intermixing,” and would thereby
“contravene[] the will of God.” Piggie Park, Pet. App. 21a (Second Amended Answer, Sixth
Defense), id. at 126a (testimony of L. Maurice Bessinger). (In a single terse sentence, the
Court unanimously held that this free exercise argument was “so patently frivolous” that it
would “manifestly inequitable” not to reward attorneys’ fees to the parties challenging the
discrimination. 390 U.S. at 402 n.5.) See also, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461
U.S. 574, 580-81 (1983) (university sought to sustain its prohibition on interracial student
dating, without losing federal tax benefits, because “sponsors of the University genuinely
believe[d] that the Bible forbids interracial dating and marriage”); United States v. Lee, 455
U.S. 252, 255 & n.3 (1982); Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security
Division, 450 U.S. 707, 710-12 (1981).

32.

NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 21, at 2575 n.243 (“Business owners with religious objections to
same-sex marriage who serve customers in compliance with antidiscrimination laws are still
free to voice their objections to same-sex marriage.”).

33.

See also Sherif Girgis, Nervous Victors, Illiberal Measures: A Response to Douglas NeJaime and
Reva Siegel, 125 YALE L.J. F. 399, 406 (2016) (noting that religious exercise, including
worship and proselytization, frequently subjects nonbelievers to moral stigma).

34.

NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 21, at 2583 n.275.

35.

Id.; see also id. at 2586 (suggesting that the state should find “ways to accommodate religious
persons without giving legal sanction to their view that other law-abiding citizens are
sinning”(emphasis added)).
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insurance company does what the objecting religious employer wishes to
avoid, is an accommodation of this sort. So, too, is a recent North Carolina law
that gives an individual magistrate the right to categorically recuse from
performing marriages for a six-month period “based upon any sincerely held
religious objection,” but that also requires the chief district court judge to
“ensure that all individuals issued a marriage license seeking to be married
before a magistrate may marry,” and requires the Administrative Office of the
Courts to ensure that a substitute magistrate is available to perform marriages
in a hypothetical jurisdiction where all the magistrates have recused.36
Where the state fashions such an accommodation, its manifest judgment
about the underlying legal norm (e.g., that women should have ready access to
affordable contraception, or that same-sex couples should not be subject to
discrimination) puts the state itself at odds with the religious objectors on the
question of whether the third party’s conduct is moral or sinful. In such cases,
the state has not embraced or ratified the objectors’ view about sinful conduct;
it has, instead, navigated a way to respect the conscience of the objector while
also ensuring that the law continues to work as designed, without
compromising the rights of third parties. These are, in effect, “win/win”
solutions of the sort the Court in Hobby Lobby hoped it had fashioned under
RFRA.37
In other situations, however, where such a work-around is not available,
recognizing a complicity-based RFRA claim would deny third parties a public
benefit, or equal access to “public establishments.”38 In those cases, the
material harms themselves, together with the “stigmatizing injury” that
“‘surely accompanies’” an exclusion in the public accommodation setting,39 will
be more than sufficient to justify denying the RFRA exemption.40 Accordingly,
any additional harm associated with the implication of sinful conduct will
virtually never affect how courts decide such cases. A court that has already
denied the RFRA exemption based upon material harm to third parties, and/or
the dignitary harm caused by the exclusion itself, will not need to fall back on
the distinct harm associated with the taint of “immoral” conduct. And if, by
contrast, a judge is determined (improperly) to grant a RFRA exemption
despite the material or dignitary harm to third parties, it is hard to imagine

36.

N.C. GEN. STATUTES § 51-5.5(a), (c).

37.

See 134 S. Ct. at 2760 (“The effect of the HHS-created accommodation on the women
employed by Hobby Lobby and the other companies involved in these cases would
be precisely zero. Under that accommodation, these women would still be entitled to all
FDA-approved contraceptives without cost sharing.”).

38.

Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964).

39.

Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984) (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel,
379 U.S. at 250).

40.

See infra notes 109-111 and accompanying text.
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that the implied accusation of sin would affect that judge’s disposition. In
all events, the objectors’ allegation of immoral conduct is unlikely to be
determinative of the RFRA claim.
The more significant component of NeJaime and Siegel’s critique is their
demonstration that the new complicity claims receive much different, and
more sophisticated, support than religious exemption claims have ever before
enjoyed. Historically, claims for exemption from commercial regulations were
idiosyncratic, brought intermittently by plaintiffs who rarely engendered
sustained assistance or political support. By contrast, dozens of plaintiffs,
including major corporations, reputable and well-established educational
institutions (including the University of Notre Dame and Catholic University),
and even some Roman Catholic archdioceses, have raised RFRA claims in the
contraception cases.
As NeJaime and Siegel describe the phenomenon, mobilized groups,
together with public officials and important figures in the broader movement
opposing same-sex marriage and contraceptive rights, have collectively
encouraged and organized the new complicity claims, and have retained a
sophisticated cadre of attorneys to litigate them, all in the service of a
broader political and moral agenda. On this view, a principal objective of the
complicity claims is not to promote pluralism, or to “turn down the
temperature” by carving out discrete enclaves where religious objectors can
quietly preserve remnants of the old moral order,41 but instead to foment
continued opposition to the new moral norms, so as to “enable the conflict to
persist in a new, revitalized form,” and possibly even to lay the groundwork for
a restoration of the recently vanquished traditional norms as part of the formal
state legal order.42
NeJaime and Siegel’s descriptive account is compelling. It is not entirely
clear, however, what (if anything) follows from it in terms of how
administrators and judges ought to treat the exemption claims themselves.
41.

See, e.g., Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Benificente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 432
(2006) (granting RFRA exemption to the Controlled Substances Act where the government
had failed to demonstrate that the “circumscribed, sacramental use of hoasca” by a 130member Christian Spiritist sect would result in the harms ordinarily associated with the use
of hallucinogens).

42.

NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 21, at 2563. As Sam Bagenstos similarly observes, such claims
for exemption might be part of a strategic retreat to more politically congenial ground from
which to resist or partially roll back the new norms. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The
Unrelenting Libertarian Challenge to Public Accommodations Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1205, 1219,
1233, 1239-40 (2014); see also William P. Marshall, Bad Statutes Make Bad Law: Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 122 (“RFRA claims can be used for immediate political
effect such as weakening the political viability of a challenged provision. A judicial
determination that a law offends religious principle sends a negative message about that
law, particularly when the determination is that the law transgresses the beliefs of a
mainstream religion.”).
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Another commenter in this symposium, Douglas Laycock, reads NeJaime
and Siegel to be arguing that the state has an independent “compelling
governmental interest” in denying exemptions in order to preserve the newly
emergent moral code against efforts to sustain the political conflict.43 I am not
sure NeJaime and Siegel mean to advance such a bold idea—certainly, they do
not do so directly.44
In any event, such a suggestion would fall on deaf ears: no state would ever
argue, in an actual case, that it has a legitimate, let alone a compelling, interest
in suppressing a political debate that might threaten to alter the existing legal
regime. After all, presumably there was nothing problematic, from the state’s
point of view, when the former political minority spent decades fighting
to upend the then-majoritarian views limiting access to contraception and
marriage equality. So why should the state’s posture toward the revanchist
strategy by the old guard be any different? Indeed, when a period of intense
moral contestation culminates in adoption of the newly emergent majority
norms as part of the state's fundamental legal code, the suppression of
alternative constitutional narratives can be a deeply unfortunate collateral cost
of an evolution that is otherwise grounds for celebration.45 It would therefore
be troublesome, at the very least, for the state to assert that such suppression of
the once-dominant perspective—or the cessation of a principled public debate
that only recently shifted in valence—is itself a compelling government interest
that might independently justify denial of what would otherwise be a valid
RFRA claim. I do not read NeJaime and Siegel to be suggesting otherwise.
Nonetheless, NeJaime and Siegel’s descriptive account is important for
another reason: The historical and institutional context they describe helps to
explain a feature of the new RFRA claims that NeJaime and Siegel do not
emphasize, but that is, I think, the principal source of the emerging tensions in
the old RFRA coalition. Precisely because so much is at stake in the new
complicity claims, beyond simply the ability of a handful of religious believers
to carve out a private space in which they can freely practice their religion, the
proponents of the new complicity claims have engaged in a concerted and
sophisticated effort to have the courts untether the substance of RFRA analysis

43.

Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty for Politically Active Minority Groups: A Response to
NeJaime and Siegel, 125 YALE L.J. F. 369, 371 (2016).

44.

Laycock fixes on one sentence in their article that could be read to suggest such a view: “If
granting a religious accommodation would harm those protected by the antidiscrimination
law or undermine societal values and goals the statute promotes, then unencumbered
enforcement of the statute is the least restrictive means of achieving the government’s
compelling ends.” Id. (quoting NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 21, at 2581 (emphasis added by
Laycock)). Laycock reads this sentence to suggest that the state should have a compelling
interest in denying exemptions even if no one would “actually be harmed,” so long as the
“religious exemptions might help sustain a political argument over government policy.” Id.

45.

See Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983).
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from its grounding in the Supreme Court’s historical jurisprudence of religious
exemptions. As I explain in the remainder of this essay, this novel initiative, if
successful, would have a dramatic and unprecedented impact on the law of
religious accommodations.
ii. t h e d o c t r in a l in n o v a t io n s o f t h e n e w r f r a c o m p lic it y
c la im s
The proponents of the new exemptions have consistently made two
noteworthy arguments that could, in combination, induce the Supreme Court
to fundamentally transform the jurisprudence of religious exemptions.
A. Deference to Complicity-Based Theories of Substantial Burden
First, in order to establish that the contraceptive coverage rule substantially
burdens their religious exercise, the RFRA claimants have exploited the
Supreme Court’s traditional, and understandable, reluctance to evaluate
believers’ assertions of what constitutes religiously prohibited complicity in
another’s wrongful conduct. The Court credited the plaintiffs’ complicity
arguments in Hobby Lobby, for instance. Invoking pre-RFRA Free Exercise
doctrine, the majority explained that because “‘courts must not presume to
determine . . . the plausibility of a religious claim,’”46 the judiciary’s “‘narrow
function . . . in this context’” is solely “‘to determine’ whether the line the
plaintiff has drawn reflects ‘an honest conviction.’”47
It is not as obvious as the Court made it sound that such complicity
assessments—which generally do not depend upon biblical injunction or
received truth, nor require “scriptural interpretation”48—are invariably the
sorts of religious claims that civil authorities are incapable of assessing. But
that is a topic for another day. For present purposes, the significant point is
that the Justices appear to be deeply reluctant to interrogate such claims. The
RFRA claimants’ very framing of their alleged religious obligations therefore
might be sufficient to clear the RFRA hurdle of showing a “substantial burden”
on their exercise of religion.49

46.

Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2778 (2014) (quoting Employment
Div., Dep’t of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990)).

47.

Id. at 2779 (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716
(1981)).

48.

Thomas, 450 U.S. at 716.

49.

But see Brief for the Respondents at 41-53, Zubik v. Burwell, Nos. 14-1418, et al. (Feb. 10,
2016) (arguing that petitioners have not established a substantial burden as a matter of law,
even assuming the substance of their complicity claims); Brief of Baptist Joint Committee
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This in turn shifts virtually all of the doctrinal action to the “back end” of
RFRA—to the government’s burden of showing that denial of the religious
exemption is the “least restrictive means” of furthering compelling state
interests.50 It is with respect to that question that the recent claimants have
urged the Supreme Court to fundamentally alter how it assesses RFRA claims,
in a manner that would upend the compromise of 1993 and deviate from the
consistent judicial practice of the past half-century.
B. Treating RFRA’s “Compelling Interest” / “Least Restrictive Means” Test as
“Exceptionally Demanding”
In Hobby Lobby, the religious claimants argued that RFRA’s “compelling
interest” / “least restrictive means” test “is ‘the most demanding test known to
constitutional law.’”51 Justice Alito, author of the majority opinion, appeared to
agree: the government’s burden, he wrote, is “exceptionally demanding.”52
Most alarmingly, Justice Alito went so far as to suggest that if Congress might
conceivably appropriate new funds to compensate for the harms that a
religious exemption would visit upon third parties, the possibility of such a
new appropriations statute—no matter how unlikely—could be “a viable
alternative,” and thus a less restrictive means of advancing the government’s
interests, thereby requiring conferral of the RFRA exemptions.53
The Court did not hold either of these things.54 But the petitioners in the
current nonprofit cases are now urging the Court to do so55—a prospect that
could have a dramatic impact on the ability of the government to deny RFRA
for Religious Liberty as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 7-26, Zubik v.
Burwell, Nos. 14-1418, et al. (Feb. 17, 2016) (same).
50.

See Brief of Amici Curiae Scholars of Religious Liberty Sarah Barringer Gordon, R. Kent
Greenawalt, Martin S. Lederman, Ira C. Lupu, and Robert W. Tuttle in Support of
Respondents at 23-24, Zubik v. Burwell, Nos. 14-1418, et al. (Feb. 17, 2016) [hereinafter
Zubik Religious Liberty Scholars Br.]; see also Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680,
700 (1989) (reasoning that the more capacious the theory of religious burden, the more
“powerful” is the Government’s interest in avoiding religious exemptions).

51.

Brief of Respondents at 44, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No.
13-354) (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997)).

52.

134 S. Ct. at 2780 (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532).

53.

Id. at 2780.

54.

In a footnote, Justice Alito wrote that “[f]or present purposes, it is unnecessary to adjudicate
th[e] dispute” about whether RFRA established a new, much more searching, form of a
“least restrictive means” test. Id. at 2678 n.18. And although it granted the requested RFRA
exemptions, the Court ultimately did not “rely on the option of a new, governmentfunded program in order to conclude that the HHS regulations fail the least-restrictivemeans test.” Id. at 2781-82; see also id. at 2786 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stressing that the
Court had not decided that question).

55.

See, e.g., ETBU Pet. Br., supra note 29, at 72-74.

427

the yale law journal forum

March 16, 2016

exemptions that would harm third parties or otherwise frustrate compelling
government interests. It is therefore important to explain why Justice Alito’s
assumptions about what Congress did when it enacted RFRA are
fundamentally mistaken.
iii. w h a t d id r f r a “ r e s t o r e ” ?
RFRA was a legislative response to the Supreme Court’s 1990 decision in
Employment Division v. Smith.56 In Smith, the Court “virtually eliminated the
[constitutional] requirement that the government justify burdens on religious
exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion”57—something the Court had
insisted upon in a series of Free Exercise Clause cases over the previous thirty
years. According to Congress, in those earlier Free Exercise cases the Court had
applied “a workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty
and competing prior governmental interests.”58 Accordingly, it enacted RFRA
to “restore,” as a statutory mandate, that “compelling interest test.”59
In Hobby Lobby, however, Justice Alito tentatively endorsed an assumption
the Court had made in a much earlier case—namely, that “RFRA’s ‘least
restrictive means requirement was not used in the pre-Smith jurisprudence
RFRA purported to codify.’”60 ”On this understanding of our preSmith cases,” wrote Justice Alito, “RFRA did more than merely restore the
balancing test used in the Sherbert line of [Free Exercise] cases; it provided
even broader protection for religious liberty than was available under those
decisions.”61
Which is it? Did RFRA restore a test that the Court had applied before
Smith, or did Congress impose a new obligation on the government that
provides much more robust protection for religious exemptions than the Court
did before 1990? In order to answer that question, it is necessary to examine
how the RFRA consensus in Congress almost broke apart in the early 1990s,
and how it was salvaged.
Virtually all members of Congress agreed that Congress should enact a law
that would effectively “correct” what they saw as the Court’s mistake in Smith,
by restoring the substance of the Court’s pre-Smith jurisprudence. There was
one big problem, however. The actual language the sponsors settled upon to
describe the government’s burden—to show that denial of a religious
56.

494 U.S. 872 (1990).

57.

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4).

58.

Id. § 2000bb(a)(5).

59.

Id. § 2000bb(b)(1).

60.

134 S. Ct. at 2761 n.3 (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 509).

61.

Id. (emphasis added).
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exemption “is the least restrictive means of furthering [a] compelling
governmental interest”62—had the potential, if read literally, to be much more
restrictive than anything the Court had insisted upon in its pre-Smith
jurisprudence, including, especially, a series of cases in the 1980s in which the
Court had repeatedly rejected religious exemptions to federal laws. The
prospect that the courts might construe RFRA to require exemptions that
would have been denied before Smith threatened to tear apart the delicate
congressional consensus.
Just as reproductive rights are at the heart of the current RFRA disputes,
so, too, were they the sticking point during the negotiation of RFRA in the
early 1990s. The concern at that earlier time, however, was not that religious
objectors might use RFRA to interfere with reproductive rights, but precisely
the opposite: many Catholic legislators and organizations, including most
importantly the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, opposed RFRA because
they feared that, as originally drafted, it might compel exemptions to abortion
restrictions for women who claimed they were religiously motivated to choose
abortion.63 Although the idea might appear far-fetched in retrospect, the
prospect that RFRA would become the engine of abortion rights dominated
the legislative debates, and prevented enactment of the bill for almost two
years.64
Indeed, the abortion-related concerns were so pronounced that leading
House Republican sponsors Paul Henry and Henry Hyde withdrew their
support for RFRA.65 As Representative Hyde would later recount, the test
prescribed in the bill “was of particular concern to me in the area of abortion
rights.”66 Under settled pre-Smith law, Hyde explained, there was no prospect
of successful RFRA claims for exemptions to abortion restrictions; yet “[a]
major issue of contention in the 102d Congress was whether the bill was a true
restoration of the law as it existed prior to Smith or whether it sought to
impose a more stringent statutory standard.”67
62.

Id. § 2000bb-1(1)-(2).

63.

See, e.g., The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Hearing on S. 2969 Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 102d Cong., 100, 106-110 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 Senate Hearing] http://
www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/jmd/legacy/2014/02/13/hear-j-102-82-1992.pdf [http://
perma.cc/8G2H-8KEW] (testimony and statement of Mark E. Chopko, General Counsel,
U.S. Catholic Conference); id. at 203-40 (testimony and statement of James Bopp, Jr.,
General Counsel, National Right to Life Committee, Inc.).

64.

See S. REP. No. 103-111, at 12 (1993) (“There has been much debate about this act’s relevance
to the issue of abortion.”); Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, 73 TEX. L. REV. 209, 231-34, 236-38 (1994) (recounting the legislative
deliberations about abortion).

65.

Id. at 237.

66.

139 CONG. REC. 9682 (1993).

67.

Id.
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In order to bridge the abortion divide, RFRA proponents changed the bill,
prior to its reintroduction in the 103d Congress, to “make clear that the
statutory standard of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is the same free
exercise standard that was applied by the U.S. Supreme Court prior to
Smith.”68 As so amended, it became clear that “the Religious Freedom Act is
not seeking to impose a new and strengthened compelling State interest
standard, but is seeking to replicate, by statute, the same free exercise test that
was applied prior to Smith.”69 In particular, as Representative Hyde explained,
“[t]he bill now clearly imposes a statutory standard that is to be interpreted as
incorporating all Federal court cases prior to Smith.”70
According to Douglas Laycock and Oliver Thomas—both of whom were
deeply involved in the efforts of the Coalition for the Free Exercise of Religion
to secure passage of the bill—what finally sealed the deal, and guaranteed
Representative Hyde’s endorsement, was language the sponsors added to the
committee reports.71 That crucial addition expressly made it “absolutely clear”
that RFRA “does not expand, contract or alter the ability of a claimant to
obtain relief in a manner consistent with free exercise jurisprudence, including
Supreme Court jurisprudence, under the compelling governmental interest test
prior to Smith.”72
This report language, “agreed to by all of the bill’s lead sponsors,”73 finally
broke the logjam. Representative Hyde, the Catholic Bishops, and other
abortion opponents were mollified precisely because there was universal
recognition that the pre-1990 “free exercise jurisprudence” that RFRA would
incorporate had rarely afforded claimants the “ability . . . to obtain relief”74
in any contexts that members of the legislative consensus would strongly
oppose. And that was so because the results of the Court’s pre-Smith Free

68.

Id. Most importantly, the formal legislative findings were rewritten to clarify that “the
compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court rulings is a workable test for striking
sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests.” 42
U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5) (emphasis added). See Ira C. Lupu, Of Time and the RFRA: A
Lawyer’s Guide to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 56 MONT. L. REV. 171, 196-97 & n.97
(1995). In addition, an earlier iteration of RFRA would have required the government to
show that denial of an exemption was “essential to” a compelling government interest, see
H.R. 2797, 102d Cong. § 3(b) (1991), but RFRA as enacted requires the government to show
instead that such a denial would be “in furtherance” of a compelling interest, see 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000bb-1(b).

69.

139 CONG. REC. 9682 (1993) (remarks of Rep. Hyde).

70.

Id.

71.

Laycock & Thomas, supra note 64, at 237-38.

72.

H.R. REP. NO. 103-88, at 8 (1993); accord S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 12 (1993) (materially
indistinguishable language).

73.

Laycock & Thomas, supra note 64, at 237.

74.

H.R. REP. 103-88, at 8.
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Exercise cases hardly reflected a searching judicial review of state justifications
for denying religious exemptions: the government almost always prevailed,
notwithstanding the Court’s use of the language of so-called “strict scrutiny.”75
The eleventh-hour report language, which confirmed “the purpose of
[RFRA] . . . to ‘turn the clock back’ to the day before Smith was decided,”76
had the additional virtue of accurately reflecting the original impetus for the
legislative initiative that led to RFRA. “[T]he purpose of this act,” according to
the Senate Report, was “only to overturn the Supreme Court’s decision in
Smith”77 —not to challenge the manner in which the Court had applied the
“compelling interest”/”least restrictive means” test in the cases preceding
Smith. Those decisions, unlike Smith, did not prompt any congressional
“restoration” movement. And so, for example, the lead House sponsor of the
bill explained that RFRA would “simply restore the legal standard for
protecting religious freedom that worked so well for more than a generation.”78
If all of this is true, why did Justice Alito, in Hobby Lobby, describe RFRA’s
test as “exceptionally demanding,”79 and why did he assume that “RFRA did
more than merely restore the balancing test used in the Sherbert line of [Free
Exercise] cases” by “provid[ing] even broader protection for religious liberty
than was available under those decisions”?80
Justice Alito’s mistakes had their genesis in earlier dicta of the Court in City
of Boerne v. Flores,81 a RFRA case in which it appears the Justices were misled
by the parties’ briefing. The petitioner, City of Boerne, represented to the
Court that “the least restrictive means test has not been a staple of [the Court’s
pre-Smith] free exercise doctrine,”82 and “marks a sea change from prior free
exercise law.”83 Perhaps for tactical reasons, neither the respondent (the
Archbishop of San Antonio) nor the United States took issue with this
75.

See Smith, 494 U.S. at 883; see also Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the
Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1110 (1990) (“At the Supreme Court level, the free
exercise compelling interest test was a Potemkin doctrine.”); Christopher L. Eisgruber &
Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting
Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1247 (1994) (describing the pre-Smith doctrine as
“strict in theory but feeble in fact”); Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation, 60 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 743, 756 (1992) (describing it as “strict in theory, but ever-so-gentle in fact”).

76.

H.R. REP. 103-88, at 14-15 (statement of Reps. Hyde, Sensenbrenner, McCollum, Coble,
Canady, Inglis, and Goodlatte).

77.

S. REP. 103-111, at 12 (emphasis added).

78.

137 CONG. REC. 17036 (1991) (remarks of Rep. Solarz).

79.

134 S. Ct. at 2780.

80.

Id. at 2761 n.3.

81.

521 U.S. 507 (1997).

82.

Brief for Petitioner at 17, City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (No. 95-2074).

83.

Id. at 22; see also id. (“[T]he most oppressive aspect of RFRA for governments—the least
restrictive means test—is a virtual novelty in the free exercise arena.”).
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mischaracterization; indeed, they did not even discuss the least restrictive
means test in their briefs or at oral argument. Not surprisingly, then, the City of
Boerne Court came close to adopting the city’s (mis)reading: Justice Kennedy’s
majority opinion assumed that the least restrictive means requirement “was not
used in the pre-Smith jurisprudence RFRA purported to codify”84 ; and it
described that test as “stringent”—”the most demanding test known to
constitutional law.”85 Seventeen years later, Justice Alito, citing City of Boerne,
reiterated these mistaken assumptions in the Court’s opinion in Hobby Lobby.
In fact, a “least restrictive means test” had been a staple of the Court’s preSmith Free Exercise doctrine. In Thomas v. Review Board, for instance, Chief
Justice Burger wrote that “[t]he state may justify an inroad on religious liberty
by showing that it is the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling
state interest.”86 The Court used the same or equivalent expressions of the
constitutional test in cases both before and after Thomas.87 Indeed, by time of
Smith, that formulation had become so well-established that Justice O’Connor
described the Court as having “consistently” applied a least restrictive means
test,88 and Justice Blackmun referred to it as “a consistent and exacting
standard” that the Court had “over the years painstakingly . . . developed.”89
This doctrinal feature was not a secret to Congress as it deliberated upon
RFRA. The chief House sponsor, a leading academic expert on the law of
religious liberty, and the Congressional Research Service all informed the
legislators that the “less restrictive means” component of RFRA derived from

84.

521 U.S. at 535.

85.

521 U.S. at 533, 534. The Court left open the possibility, however, that “RFRA would be
interpreted in effect to mandate some lesser test.” Id. at 534.

86.

450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) (emphasis added).

87.

See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961) (plurality opinion) (“[I]f the State
regulates conduct by enacting a general law within its power, the purpose and effect of
which is to advance the State’s secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden
on religious observance unless the State may accomplish its purpose by means which do not impose
such a burden.”(emphasis added)); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963) (“[I]t would
plainly be incumbent upon the [government] to demonstrate that no alternative forms of
regulation would combat [the problem] without infringing First Amendment rights.”);
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982) (“The state may justify a limitation on
religious liberty by showing that it is essential to accomplish an overriding governmental
interest.”(emphasis added)); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983)
(“The interests asserted by petitioners cannot be accommodated with [the government’s]
compelling governmental interest . . . , and no ‘less restrictive means’ . . . are available to
achieve the governmental interest”(quoting Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718)).

88.

494 U.S. at 899 (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 728 (1986)
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

89.

Smith, 494 U.S. at 907 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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the Court’s pre-Smith doctrine.90 Thus, as the House Report explained, it was
“the Committee’s expectation that the courts will look to free exercise of
religion cases decided prior to Smith for guidance in determining whether or
not . . . the least restrictive means have been employed in furthering a
compelling governmental interest.”91
iv . h o w t o a p p l y r f r a ’s “ l e a s t r e s t r ic t iv e m e a n s ” t e s t
But how can that be? If the Court rarely ruled in favor of religious
exemptions before Smith, how could it possibly have been applying a “least
restrictive means” test?
The key to understanding this apparent conundrum is to recognize that not
all “compelling interest”/“least restrictive means” tests are created alike.92 In
particular, there is an important difference between the rigorous scrutiny the
Court usually applies when evaluating a statute that is specifically aimed at
restricting constitutionally protected conduct (or status), and the heightened,
but less severe, scrutiny the Court sometimes uses to assess whether the state
can justify incidental burdens on protected conduct.
The first, more familiar variant of “strict” scrutiny establishes a
presumption that the statute itself is facially invalid, precisely because the
legislature has targeted constitutionally protected activity or status. The Court
deploys this approach, for example, when a statute regulates expression on the
basis of its content,93 discriminates on the basis of race,94 or where the “object

90.

See, e.g., Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1991: Hearing on H.R. 2797 Before the
Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 102d
Cong. 121 (1992) (written statement of Rep. Solarz); id. at 342 (written statement of
Douglas Laycock, Professor of Law, University of Texas); 1992 Senate Hearing, supra note
80, at 78–79 (written statement of Prof. Laycock); DAVID M. ACKERMAN, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., LTR92-639, THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT AND THE RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM ACT: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 6 (1992).

91.

H.R. Rep. 103-88, at 6-7. There is one respect in which RFRA was designed to alter the preSmith doctrinal status quo: Congress intended that the courts would apply “compelling
interest/”least restrictive means” test in contexts where the Supreme Court had previously
applied a more deferential standard—namely, in the so-called state “enclaves” of prisons and
the military. See S. REP. 103-111, at 9-12 (explaining the intent to apply a more stringent
standard than what the Court had applied in O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342
(1987) (prisons), and in Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (military)); H.R. REP.
103-88, at 7-8 (same).

92.

See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267 (2007);
Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the
Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793 (2006).

93.

See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 665-66 (2004); United States v. Playboy Entm’t
Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 815 (2000).

94.

See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013).
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of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious
motivation.”95 Such a law will survive the Court’s “strict scrutiny” “only in rare
cases.”96 In such contexts, the “narrow tailoring” or “least restrictive means”
component of the doctrinal test asks, in effect, whether the state could have
furthered its compelling interests without targeting, such as by using raceneutral, content-neutral, or religion-neutral criteria. If the answer is “yes,” then
the legislature typically must start from scratch and consider such neutral
alternative means of advancing its interests.
By contrast, when a statute does not single out a protected activity or status,
it is presumptively (and facially) constitutional. Even so, in some such cases the
Court has applied a form of heightened scrutiny, including a “narrow
tailoring” or “less restrictive means” requirement, to evaluate the
constitutionality of the law’s incidental impact on protected activity in particular
applications.97 For example, that is how the Court has sometimes analyzed
antidiscrimination laws that incidentally limit the right of “expressive
association,”98 and laws regulating conduct (such as public nudity or burning
draft cards) that incidentally burden expressive activity.99
Most importantly for present purposes, it is also how the Court analyzed
incidental burdens on religious exercise in the decades before Smith. In these
cases, the terms of the Court’s heightened scrutiny test were similar to the
language the Court uses when assessing facial challenges to targeting
legislation, but the Court’s manner of applying the test was very different—and
much more permissive.100 And it was this more forgiving version of heightened
scrutiny that Congress incorporated into RFRA.
As cases both before and after Smith demonstrate, RFRA’s “compelling
interest”/“least restrictive means” test is by no means toothless. Most
importantly, the government must show that the state’s conferral of a religious
exemption in the discrete setting of the particular claimants (and any others
similarly situated) would actually undermine the interests underlying the
generally applicable law. The government may not simply rely upon “broadly
formulated interests justifying the general applicability of government

95.

Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993)
(emphasis added).

96.

Id. at 546.

97.

See Fallon, supra note 92, at 1318-20.

98.

See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-20 (1984).

99.

See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 571-72 (1991) (plurality opinion); United
States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 381-82 (1968).

100.

See infra notes 105-108, 117-120 and accompanying text.
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mandates”; instead, it must demonstrate the “harm of granting specific
exemptions to particular religious claimants.”101
Moreover, even when a state can show that religious exemptions might
have an impact on its compelling interests, if many other jurisdictions have
avoided those harms by using other means even while conferring such
exemptions, the challenged state “must, at a minimum, offer persuasive
reasons why it believes that it must take a different course.”102 And if the
government administrators already have other, obvious alternative means of
dealing with the asserted problems, they must grant the religious exemption
and use those alternative means unless they can show that doing so would
threaten additional harms or material costs.103
Nevertheless, in the context of assessing incidental burdens on religious
exercise, the Court has never applied the “compelling interest”/”least restrictive
means” test with remotely the same degree of scrutiny or skepticism as when
the Court confronts a law that targets constitutionally protected rights. Rather,
as the Court stated in Yoder, the de facto inquiry under the pre-Smith
Free Exercise cases—now incorporated into RFRA—is a more contextsensitive, pragmatic assessment of whether the neutral regulation “in its
application . . . unduly burdens the free exercise of religion.”104
Two aspects of this version of the “least restrictive means” test are
especially germane to the current RFRA disputes. First, both before and
after Smith, the Court has denied religious exemptions where they would
impose harms on third parties. Second, the Court has never required the
government to adopt a proposed alternative means of furthering its compelling
interests if it would require enactment of a new statute—especially an
additional appropriation—in order to ameliorate the impact of religious
exemptions on compelling government interests.

101.

O Centro, 546 U.S. at 431; see also Zubik Religious Liberty Scholars Br., supra note 50, at 1920, 21 n.13 (explaining how the failure to meet this burden required the conferral of religious
exemptions in O Centro and Yoder).

102.

Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 866; see also, e.g., Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407 & n.7.

103.

See, e.g., Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 864 (Arkansas Department of Correction had “failed to prove that
it could not adopt the less restrictive alternative of having the prisoner run a comb through
his beard” to find hidden weapons).

104.

406 U.S. at 220 (emphasis added); accord United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259 (1982)
(describing the “inquiry” as whether the religious accommodation, for the claimant and
similarly situated objectors, “will unduly interfere with fulfillment of the governmental
interest”). State and lower federal courts have long interpreted and implemented the preSmith Free Exercise test, as well as RFRA, RLUIPA, and their state-law counterparts, in
accord with this pragmatic understanding of the Supreme Court’s pre-Smith jurisprudence.
See Ira C. Lupu, Hobby Lobby and the Dubious Enterprise of Religious Exemptions, 38 HARV.
J.L. & GEN. 35, 50-53, 54-66 (2015).
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These limitations explain why, for many decades before Smith, the Court
never recognized religious exemptions to generally applicable laws regulating
the commercial sphere, even where the Court purported to apply a demanding
“substantial burden”/“compelling interest” test. The Court rejected such claims
at least ten times between 1944 and 1990, in cases involving many different
sorts of commercial regulation, including child protection laws105; wage and
hour legislation106; Sunday closing laws107; and tax obligations.108
A. Third-Party Burdens
In commercial settings, recognizing a religious exemption would typically
require third parties (customers, employees, and/or competitors) to bear
burdens in the service of another’s religion, which would violate one of the
central tenets of the First Amendment, namely, that nonbelievers should not be
compelled to subsidize, or suffer in the service of, the religious commitments of
others: “It is beyond dispute that, at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees
that government may not coerce anyone to support . . . religion or its
exercise.”109 Indeed, where religious exemptions impose significant costs upon
105.

Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).

106.

Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985).

107.

Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market of
Mass., Inc., 366 U.S. 617 (1961).

108.

Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S. 378 (1990); Hernandez
v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989); Covenant Community Church v. Lowe, 475 U.S.
1078 (1986) (dismissing appeal for want of substantial federal question); United States v.
Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
The votes in these cases were rarely even close. With the exception of the “Sunday
closing” cases (which were colored by a dubious legislative preference for the traditional
Christian day of rest), it was rare for even a single Justice to support a religious exemption.
Justice Murphy would have granted the exemption in Prince, but only because he concluded
that the case did not involve commercial activity. 321 U.S. at 171 (Murphy, J., dissenting).

109.
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Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992); see also Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472
U.S. 703, 710 (1984) (describing as a “fundamental principle of the Religion Clauses” that
“‘[t]he First Amendment gives no one the right to insist that in pursuit of their own
interests others must conform their conduct to his own religious necessities’” (quoting
Otten v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 205 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1953) (L. Hand, J.))). Douglas
Laycock is of course correct that “[m]ost exercises of constitutional rights inflict costs on
others.” Laycock, supra note 43, at 379. There is, for instance, no independent constitutional
imperative that private individuals not bear the costs of others’ speech, or that application of
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to protect a criminal defendant must not impose harms
on members of the public. Indeed, such third-party harms are ubiquitous when those other
constitutional rights are vindicated. But that is decidedly not true with respect to religious
exercise, where it has long been a constitutional tenet that an individual who does not share
another’s belief in God should not have to pay a cost so that the believer can follow what she
believes to be God’s dictates. Cf. JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST
RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS ¶ 3 (1785), reprinted in Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, 330 U.S.
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third parties, they can raise serious Establishment Clause concerns.110 For these
reasons, the state has a compelling interest in denying exemptions that pose a
risk of third-party harms.
The Court’s rejection of claims for religious exemptions to
antidiscrimination laws nicely illustrates that when a religious accommodation
would harm the civil rights of third parties—even a relatively small group of
third parties—the government is not required to grant the exemption. In Bob
Jones University v. United States, for example, the Court held that the Internal
Revenue Service’s refusal to grant tax-exempt status to private schools that
practiced racial discrimination was necessary to further the government’s
compelling interest in eradicating race discrimination, even though the effect of
the requested exemption would only have been felt by the relatively small
number of African American students who would choose to attend the small
handful of the nation’s schools of higher education that had retained
discriminatory practices.111

1, 64, 65-66 (1947) (remonstrating that the government in a free society may not “force a
citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the support of any one
establishment” of religion).
110.

See, e.g., Estate of Thornton, 472 U.S. at 709-10 (holding that a religious accommodation
statute was unconstitutional in part because it “would cause the employer substantial
economic burdens or . . . require the imposition of significant burdens on other employees
required to work in place of the Sabbath observers”); Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489
U.S. 1, 15 (1989) (plurality opinion) (characterizing religious exemptions that “burden[]
non-beneficiaries markedly” as “unjustifiable awards of assistance to religious
organizations”). But cf. Corporation for Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987)
(holding that the exemption to Title VII’s prohibition against employment discrimination
on the basis of religion, permitting religious organizations to prefer employment of
coreligionists, was constitutional as applied to a church’s discharge of a gymnasium building
engineer).

111.

461 U.S. at 603-04; see also Zubik Religious Liberty Scholars Br., supra note 50, at 25-27
(discussing Bob Jones); id. at 17-18 (discussing the distinction between Braunfeld and Sherbert
in terms of the risk of third-party harms in the earlier case). Petitioners in the pending Zubik
case therefore are mistaken when they argue that the government must demonstrate how
many plan beneficiaries would take advantage of subsidized contraception if the
organizations’ RFRA exemptions were denied. See Reply Brief for Petitioners in Nos. 141418 et al. at 32-33, Zubik v. Burwell, No. 14-1418 (Mar. 11, 2016). The United States has a
compelling interest in ensuring that the women covered by the plans in question are not
denied access to cost-free coverage, whether they number in the tens or hundreds of
thousands (as the government estimates), or “merely” hundreds. What is more, to the
extent petitioners were correct that some of the women in question would not use
contraception, or would not seek reimbursement for it, in those cases the petitioners’
“complicity in sin” theory of substantial burden would be inapposite.
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B. The Prospect of Further Legislation as a “Less Restrictive Means”
In Hobby Lobby, Justice Alito suggested that applying a law to religious
objectors cannot be the “least restrictive” means of advancing compelling
government interest if the legislature might in theory appropriate additional
funds to further those interests.112 Likewise, the petitioners in the current Zubik
litigation, invoking cases challenging the facial validity of contentdiscriminatory speech restrictions, argue that the Court “routinely identifies
options that would require congressional action as feasible less restrictive
means.”113 They thus insist that RFRA entitles them to an exemption from the
agencies’ accommodation because Congress could, for example, enact a new
law allowing their employees to purchase a subsidized, second insurance plan
on an insurance exchange.114
It is true that RFRA and RLUIPA “may in some circumstances require the
Government to expend additional funds to accommodate citizens’ religious
beliefs.”115 For example, if the executive branch already has access to
appropriated funds that it could lawfully use to ameliorate third-party harms,
it might have to use those funds to do so, all else being equal.116 It is another
thing entirely, however, to suggest that the theoretical prospect of a new
appropriations statute is a “less restrictive means” for purposes of the RFRA
inquiry.
Inquiring about the prospect of alternative legislative action makes perfect
sense when the Court applies its more familiar form of “strict scrutiny,” such as
in assessing the constitutionality of a content-based federal speech restriction.
In such cases, the operative question is whether Congress could have addressed
its interests by enacting a different, content-neutral law. If the Court concludes
that such a neutral law would have sufficed as a “less restrictive” means of
dealing with the problem, the Court typically declares that the challenged law
is facially invalid—in which case the legislature, if it wishes to address the
problem, must go back to the drawing board.

112.

134 S. Ct. at 2780-81.

113.

See ETBU Pet. Br., supra note 29, at 74 (citing Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 669 (2004);
United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 815 (2000)); see also Brief for Petitioners
in Nos. 14-1418, et al. at 81, Zubik v. Burwell, No. 14-1418 (Jan. 4, 2016).

114.

ETBU Pet. Br., supra note 29, at 73-74.

115.

134 S. Ct. at 2781. RLUIPA expressly provides that “this chapter may require a government
to incur expenses in its own operations to avoid imposing a substantial burden on religious
exercise.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–3(c).

116.

Indeed, as part of the contraception accommodation itself, the agencies use their existing
authority to reduce user fees in order to reimburse third-party administrators of self-insured
employee health plans for the costs of contraception coverage. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.7152713A(b)(3); 45 C.F.R. § 156.50(d); see Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2763 n.8.
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By contrast, when it comes to a facially valid law of general applicability,
such as the contraceptive regulation, religious objectors of many kinds might,
over the years, seek exemptions. At those later times (and there could be many
of them), Congress and/or the President might be hostile or indifferent to the
compelling interests underlying the original law—interests that the courts
applying RFRA are required to account for. But even if the later-in-time
executive and legislature do care about those state interests, they will invariably
have more pressing legislative agendas, and will lack the incentives and/or
political capital to pass legislation to pay for the costs of all and sundry
requested RFRA exemptions down through the years. It therefore would make
little sense to view the mere fact that future legislatures have the authority to
enact such piecemeal “RFRA fixes” as establishing a “less restrictive”
alternative that requires religious exemptions that will, in fact, undermine the
state’s compelling interests.
This is hardly a “radically revisionist account of RFRA.”117 It is, instead,
consistent with the outcomes of the Court’s pre-Smith Free Exercise cases and
with its decisions under RFRA and RLUIPA. In every case in which the Court
has recognized a religious exemption (such as Sherbert, Yoder, O Centro, and
Holt), no further legislation was necessary to empower the state executive to
implement that exemption. By contrast, the Court has never granted an
exemption on the grounds that theoretical supplemental legislation might
ameliorate the harm to state interests.
United States v. Lee is illustrative. Lee, an employer and member of the Old
Order Amish, believed it was sinful for his employees, all of whom were also
his co-religionists, to accept government aid. He therefore sought an
exemption from the requirement to remit Social Security taxes for his
employees because it was religiously impermissible for him to contribute to
such a redistribution scheme. The Court unanimously denied the exemption,
nominally on the ground that universal participation was “essential” to
advancing the government’s interest in the fiscal vitality of the Social Security
system.118 As Justice Stevens pointed out, however, that was patently not the
case. Congress had already exempted other religious employers, and “it would
be a relatively simple matter,” Stevens explained, for Congress to extend its
exemption, without any harm to the system, to a discrete religious community
with its own welfare system, if the employees in question forfeited their right
to collect benefits.119 Indeed, several years later, Congress enacted that very

117.

Eternal Word Television Network, Inc. v. Secretary of the United States Dep’t of Health
and Human Servs., 2016 WL 659222, at *53 (11th Cir. 2016) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting).

118.

455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982).

119.

Id. at 262 (Stevens, J., concurring). Within the Court, there was at least some recognition
that Chief Justice Burger’s draft majority opinion did not adequately engage with the
points Justice Stevens was raising, and with the difference between Lee’s requested
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religious exemption.120 The Court in Lee, however, did not consider the
hypothetical possibility of such a tailored congressional accommodation to be a
relevant “less restrictive means,” even though such an alternative certainly
could have been—and was—imagined.
That disposition in Lee made a great deal of sense. When conferral of a
religious exemption would undermine a compelling government interest, such
as avoiding harm to third parties, a subsequent legislature will often, in theory,
be able to cure the problem with a statutory “fix,” especially a new
appropriation. As Justice Ginsburg asked in her Hobby Lobby dissent, however,
“where is the stopping point to the ‘let the government pay’ alternative?”121 If a
new appropriations law were deemed a “less restrictive” alternative, then the
government would virtually always have to afford exemptions, no matter how
severe the harm to government interests, simply because Congress could in
theory ameliorate the harm through additional taxing and spending.
That does not describe the Court’s pre-Smith jurisprudence of “less
restrictive means,” and it cannot be what Congress intended when it
enacted RFRA.122 Indeed, the very prospect, or possibility, of such a regime
undoubtedly would have doomed any prospect of RFRA’s enactment.
c o n c lu s io n
Nothing in the Court’s actual disposition of Hobby Lobby is inconsistent
with this understanding of RFRA and the pre-Smith jurisprudence that it
incorporates. Indeed, the majority opinion expressly recognized that “cost may
accommodation and a run-of-the-mill religious objection to paying income taxes. See
Memorandum from Frank Holleman, Law Clerk, to Justice Blackmun, re: No. 80-767,
United States v. Lee, at 3 (Dec. 3, 1981) (on file with the Library of Congress) (Harry A.
Blackmun Papers, box 343, folder 80-767) (Justice Blackmun making “check mark” marginal
notation to law clerk’s observation that “it would be a much more honest opinion if the
Court admitted that the Amish have a stronger case than do tax protestors who object to
paying income taxes for a government service without providing the government service
themselves”); see also Memorandum from Frank Holleman, Law Clerk, to Justice Blackmun,
re: No. 80-767, United States v. Lee, at 2 (Jan. 15, 1982) (on file with the Library of Congress)
(Harry A. Blackmun Papers, box 343, folder 80-767) (noting that “Justice Stevens makes
two valid points,” including that “Lee’s argument is stronger than the Chief Justice
admits”).
120.

See Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3781 (1988) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 3127).

121.

Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2802 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

122.

Cf. Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 94 (Cal. 2004)
(rejecting the argument that the California Legislature could more widely exempt employers
from a contraception coverage requirement without increasing the number of affected
women by providing public funding of contraceptives for the employees of exempted
employers, even though the legislature had considered such a provision in an earlier version
of the WCEA: “Catholic Charities points to no authority requiring the state to subsidize
private religious practices.”).
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be an important factor in the least-restrictive-means analysis,” and that “in
applying RFRA ‘courts must take adequate account of the burdens a requested
accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries.’”123
It therefore remains an open question whether the Court will transform
RFRA into “a bold initiative departing from, rather than restoring, pre-Smith
jurisprudence”124 —a “Religious Freedom Revolution Act,” as it were.125 If the
Court takes that step, as some components of the old RFRA coalition are
urging it to do, that would be a sharp and alarming break with the past—an
outcome difficult to reconcile with the notion that the Court “must . . . respect
the role of the Legislature, and take care not to undo what it has done.”126 “A
fair reading of legislation demands a fair understanding of the legislative
plan.”127 In the case of RFRA, that legislative plan was to restore, rather than to
radically transform, the law of religious accommodations.
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Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2781 & n.37 (quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720
(2005)); see also id. at 2786-87 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (explaining that the state may not
permit religious exercise to “unduly restrict other persons, such as employees, in protecting
their own interests” that “the law deems compelling”); id. at 2801 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 2791-92 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

125.

See Eternal Word Television Network, 2016 WL 659222, at *50 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting)
(describing RFRA as a ”mighty bulwark, entrenching against Government incursion the
freedom of religious liberty throughout the United States Code”).
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King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2015).
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